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The Realities of a New Asylum Paradigm 
 
Abstract: 
In recent years, forced migration scholars have begun to ask whether we are 
seeing the emergence of a New Asylum Paradigm around the current (or 
resurgent) debate on ‘in-region asylum processing’, ‘regional protection 
zones’ and ‘transit processing centres’.  Although similar ideas have been 
around in various forms for some time, there appears currently to be a 
convergence of thinking, seen in debates within the EU, the UNHCR’s 
Convention Plus, the British government’s proposal on ‘new’ approaches to 
asylum seekers and related proposals from the German and Italian 
governments. This article looks briefly at the discussions around processing 
centres, which seem to have focussed attention on whether a New Asylum 
Paradigm is emerging, and to explore developments on the ground, asking to 
what extent alleged novelties constitute a new, or a single, paradigm. We 
suggest that although there are apparently competing, conflicting and 
contradictory proposals and projects on the table, in fact a common logic 
underpins all of them. Following a sketch of the different proposals we 
consider the positions of some of the states involved in these developments. 
We then examine what’s happening on the ground in two states targeted as 
potential partners in the proposals – Libya and Morocco. In the last section of 
the paper, the significance, novelty and dangers of the proposals are 
evaluated. 
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The Realities of a New Asylum Paradigm 
 
Background and Introduction: The New (?) Proposals 
In February 2003, a UK plan for creating Regional Protection Zones (RPZ) 
and Transit Processing Centres (TPC) hit the headlines and provoked 
considerable discussion (Home Office 2003a, 2003b). RPZs were to be 
located in the region from where refugees were fleeing, whereas TPCs were 
to be located in countries bordering the EU that are transited by people who 
might claim asylum in EU member states (Home Office 2003a). The plans 
were less surprising than the furore that was unleashed – especially since 
there was little that was new about the proposals – they had been around in 
different guises for at least 10 years. The UK government, borrowing 
inspiration from Australia’s Pacific Solution and earlier Danish proposals for 
reception in the region (Noll 2003) and rhetoric from the UNHCR’s Agenda for 
Protection (UNHCR 2003), had developed its own proposals1 to contain 
potential asylum seekers either in the region of origin or in transit processing 
centres.  
The UK proposals were born of an overriding concern to reduce the 
numbers of people entering and applying for asylum in the UK. They were 
leaked in the same month that the Prime Minister announced his intention to 
reduce applications to the UK by half. While not original, and while Britain’s 
focus on asylum seekers is relatively unusual in Europe, the proposals 
chimed with a concern in other EU states to keep potential seekers of asylum 
at a distance. Although the numbers of asylum seekers has gone down in the 
intervening two years (UNHCR 2004a)2, the desire to be able to control how 
many enter a state and under what conditions remains – there is always the 
possibility that another conflict will drive the numbers up again. There seems 
finally to be some acceptance that whatever the political rhetoric designed for 
domestic consumption – domestic policies relating to welfare etc. do not act 
as deterrents, and so the emphasis continues to be on preventing access. 
                                                 
1 Referred to in the plural because they went through a number of revisions – see 
Noll (2003) and Betts (2004). 
2 The trend is different in the 10 new Member States where numbers have increased 
in each year (UNHCR 2004a, 3). 
 1
This has led the UK and other EU states to move their migration controls 
outside their territories – for example, to Belgian and French ports and to 
Czech, Sri Lankan and Pakistani airports in order to prevent people entering 
the UK. 
The tightening of controls has led to a sharp increase in the number of 
people dying as they try to enter EU states – a fact that is becoming 
increasingly difficult to ignore as bodies wash up on Mediterranean beaches 
(Statewatch 2003). The Association des Amis et des Familles des Victimes de 
l’Immigration Clandestine estimate that 3,285 bodies were found in the 
Straits of Gibraltar alone between 1997 and 2001. From a public relations 
perspective it would be far better to intercept these people quickly and return 
them whence they came. However, three conditions are necessary for this 
strategy: 1) that the transit states/states of origin accept the ‘returnees’; 2) 
that there is somewhere to hold them while awaiting return to a final 
destination; and 3) the creation of asylum procedures in the transit countries 
that make return legally palatable. The UK proposals were designed to put 
these three conditions in place. The third condition overlapped with UNHCR 
proposals and perhaps explains the confusion between plans for camps to 
hold people, and plans to build greater capacity for protection in region. 
In 2000, UNHCR had announced its Global Consultations, the purpose 
of which was ‘to provoke both reflection and action to revitalize the 1951 
Convention framework and to equip States better to address the challenges 
in a spirit of dialogue and cooperation’. This resulted in the publication of the 
Agenda for Protection at the end of 2001. The Agenda specified six goals that 
would progressively reinforce refugee protection over a multiyear period. 
These goals included the push for universal accession to the 1951 
Convention, improving asylum procedures, the sharing of burdens and 
responsibilities more equitably and the building of capacities to receive and 
protect refugees in those countries that hosted the majority of refugees.  
The Agenda placed a great deal of emphasis on reaffirming the 1951 
Convention, but recognizing that more needed to be done, the Commissioner 
called for the development of new tools to improve the response to global 
refugee flows, to build the capacity of first countries of asylum – this became 
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known as ‘Convention Plus’. Although ‘Convention Plus’ can be construed as a 
means to relieve the ‘burden’ on countries in the region, it could equally be 
argued that it played into the hands of European states anxious to shirk their 
responsibilities and would lead to greater pressure on those countries already 
struggling to cope with large refugee populations. 
Subsequently, UNHCR presented a three-pronged proposal that would 
promote the goals of the Agenda at domestic, EU and regional levels. 
Following the UK’s proposals in early 2003, the EU prong was revised, 
specifying a clearer administrative structure and providing a mechanism for 
shifting from national to EU reception, processing and return/resettlement 
arrangements. It would seem that UNHCR is seeking to anchor itself within 
the protective embrace of the more progressive organs of the EU, in 
particular the Commission, with whom it has recently entered into 
partnerships. 
The EU is another major player in these developments, one whose 
different organs (the Council, the Commission and the Parliament) seem to 
be in conflict within each other. The EU response to the UK proposals was 
developed with the context of the drive towards establishing a common 
European asylum policy and system. The Council, while initially rejecting the 
UK proposals, nonetheless recommended that the Commission examine them 
in more detail. Some months later, the Commission published that response 
as the document Towards more accessible, equitable and managed asylum 
systems (Commission 2003), which inter alia, noted critically that the UK 
proposals ‘do not build upon or complement the policies already agreed upon 
in the first phase of developing a common policy’.  
The Council responded to this document at Thessalonika by inviting 
the Commission, now the policy-initiating organ of the EU, to ‘examine ways 
and means to enhance the protection capacity of regions of origin’ and ‘to 
ensure more orderly and managed entry into the EU of persons in need of 
protection’. A year later, in June 2004 – the report Improving Access to 
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Durable Solutions (Commission 2004) was published. While the directives3 
that form the cornerstones of the Common European Asylum Policy deal with 
asylum seekers within the territory of the Union, this report concentrated 
largely on regions of origin. The goal is to create mechanisms in those 
regions that remove the necessity for people in need of protection to come to 
Europe by creating procedures and infrastructures that ‘enable the countries 
in the region of origin to offer effective protection to persons requiring 
international protection as soon as possible and as closely as possible to the 
countries of turmoil (sic)’ (Vitorino 2004), i.e. that render their first countries 
of asylum ‘safe third countries’, though this seems to be less about 
protecting vulnerable people than ensuring that people can be legitimately 
returned to regions of origin. 
The EU Commission sought and found partnerships with countries in 
the region to promote these goals. The Commission and the Dutch 
government are financing 5 UN pilot projects in Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, 
Tunisia and Libya using the B7-667 budget line (although at the time of 
writing, March 2005, these were still at the consulting stage). Both the 
Commission and UNHCR were at pains to point out that these projects aim to 
build and strengthen asylum systems in the region, and not to create 
reception centres (UNHCR 2004b). The confusion arises because these same 
countries are being proposed as sites for the transit centres and because 
they are part of the same logic, in that the existence of asylum systems will 
make it possible to designate those countries safe first countries of asylum 
and hence to return people who transit them en route to Europe. 
Inevitably the plan to return people to, for example, the Maghreb 
countries, gives rise to the same kinds of concerns voiced in the early 1990s 
by Italy, a significant transit country for migrants heading to Northern 
Europe, in response to the Dublin Convention – that the majority of asylum 
seekers would sent back to Italy to have their claims heard. There are three 
possible responses to such concerns: assist the country in question to 
strengthen those sections of their borders across which the transit migrants 
                                                 
3 E.g. on minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers, on assigning 
responsibility for examining a claim, on qualifications and procedures and on 
granting and withdrawing status. 
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travel, encourage them to repatriate people back to their country of origin (or 
the last transit country) and finally, as part of a commitment to burden-
sharing promise to resettle in Europe at least some of those found to be in 
need of protection. At a recent meeting in Brussels of policy-makers and 
NGOs it was stressed that it would not be possible to expect countries in the 
region to take people back, unless EU member states agreed resettlement 
quotas. To date, as can be seen from the Table 1, the numbers envisaged 
are minimal, and yet the quotas are not being filled in spite of the numbers 
warehoused in camps across Africa and Asia.  
 
Table One: EU resettlement Quotas 
 
Source: ICAR Navigation Guide to Key Issues: Resettlement Programmes and the UK available at 
http://www.icar.org.uk/pdf/ng005.pdf
Country Year Quota Arrivals/Acceptances 
Denmark 1 Jan 2004 – 31 
Dec 2004 
500 At 20 February 2004, 20 persons had 
been accepted. 
Finland 1 Jan 2003 – 31 
Dec 2003 
750 748 accepted, 562 arrivals [of which 
489 were from the 2002 quota]. 
Ireland 1 Jan 2004 – 31 
Dec 2004 
10 cases [around 40 
persons total] 
At the beginning of January 2004, 10 
persons had been admitted, all of 
whom were from the 2003 quota. 
Netherlands 1 Jan 2004 – 31 
Dec 2004 
500 By end February 2004, 189 cases had 
been accepted and there had been 166 
arrivals. 
Sweden 1 Jan 2004 – 31 
Dec 2004 
1,700 By end February 2004, 300 had been 
accepted and 35 had arrived. 
UK 1 April 2004 – 31 
March 2004 
500 + approx. 250* By September 2004, 69 people, all 
from Liberia4, had arrived via the 
Gateway programme. 
*500 through the Gateway Protection Programme + approx. 250 through other resettlement 
programmes. 
 
Although the UK’s (and the German-Italian) proposals are contentious 
and in December 2004 were rejected by the European Parliament (European 
Parliament 2004), nonetheless the dominant logic as revealed by the 
resettlement quotas is to permit a limited and carefully selected group of 
                                                 
4 At the time, there were 500,000 Liberian refugees, most of whom were in 
neighbouring countries (UNHCR 2002 ‘Refugee population and major changes, 2002’ 
from 2002 Annual Statistical Report: Liberia, Geneva, UNHCR, 23 July 2003) 
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refugees into Europe, while ensuring that the majority stays outside of 
Europe. The reinforcing of capacity in the region, of putting in place asylum 
procedures, training officials in countries of first asylum and creating 
resettlement programmes may be a way of assisting countries who already 
host comparatively large numbers of refugees, and of trying to ensure that 
people have access to legal and other protection, but it is hard to avoid the 
conclusion that these measures also serve the purposes of European Union 
states, who will be able legally to return people to ‘safe third countries’. 
 
The Coalition of the Willing   
While initially some other EU states were quick to distance themselves from 
the UK proposals, others were more receptive. Denmark had already 
presented a similar proposal for processing centres in the region of origin in 
1986 (to the UN General Assembly) and during their presidency of the EU in 
2002 began to promote the idea of ‘reception in the region’. In 1993 a 
representative of the Dutch Ministry of Justice suggested to a meeting of EU 
ministers responsible for asylum and migration that asylum seekers should 
be sent back to reception centres in the region of origin to have their claims 
processed (Ministry of External Affairs 2003), so their support for the idea is 
perhaps unsurprising. Following the UK’s proposals, informal discussions 
between the UK, Dutch and Danish governments (together with the EU 
Commission, IOM and UNHCR) took place, leading to the ‘Danish 
Memorandum’ (Noll 2003), which set up the conditions for establishing both 
RPZs and TPCs. Although the UK has since announced that it has dropped 
plans for TPCs, from the perspective of the governments involved, they 
remain a logical development.  
At a recent seminar in Brussels organised by Oxfam, a Dutch 
representative of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs stated his government’s 
position: 
 
‘For the Dutch government protection in the region is about ensuring 
that refugees have access to protection and durable solutions as quickly 
as possible and as closely as possible to their needs. The current 
 6
international asylum regime shows some serious shortcomings. 
Strengthening protection in the region and durable solutions could do 
much to improve this situation’ (Wijnen 2004).  
 
He went on to explain that cost was a significant driving factor, illustrating his 
point by contrasting the $1 billion dollars UNHCR spent on caring for 20 million 
people of concern in 2002, with the $1.4 billion dollars the Dutch government 
had spent on 81,000 asylum seekers in the same year. This echoes the claims 
in the UK proposals that ‘asylum seekers who make it to Europe frequently 
receiv[e] support and legal costs exceeding $10,000 a year, whereas the 
UNHCR spends an average of only $50 a year on each refugee or other 
‘person of concern’ around the world’ (Home Office 2003a). Noll disputes the 
anticipated savings, arguing that in the Australian case ‘all the savings from 
reduced onshore arrivals are consumed by the massive costs of offshore 
processing in the excised zones of Australian territory and in third countries 
(Nauru & PNG)’ (2003a: 22). 
Wijnen then outlined two current pilot projects co-sponsored by the 
European Commission, the Netherlands, Denmark and the UK to be carried 
out by UNHCR: a ‘Comprehensive Plan of Action for Somali Refugees’ and a 
project which focuses on a ‘Gaps Analysis on Protection Building’ in Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Kenya and Tanzania. In addition to these projects, the Dutch 
parliament also designated an extra 5 million Euro to UNHCR in 2004, 
specifically for enhancing protection in the region. UNHCR has allocated these 
funds to protection projects in Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania and Yemen. However, 
once again, none of these projects have progressed beyond the 
discussion/desk stage. While UNHCR and the European Commission might 
argue that these projects are conceptually and legally very different from the 
camps proposed by the UK in 2003 and are instead about capacity building 
and consolidating protection in the region, the reality is that all of these 
initiatives are linked politically since overwhelmingly they are about keeping 
people as close as possible to their country of origin, that is, the site of the 
conflict. It seems inevitable therefore, that they will be linked practically in 
the future. 
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In the same speech, Wijnen argued that consolidating protection in the 
region would diminish the need for asylum seekers to risk their lives crossing 
the Mediterranean or to entrust them to traffickers. This is a theme picked up 
by Germany’s Otto Schilly. Germany, originally highly critical of the UK’s 
proposals, has now become a staunch supporter of these ideas, and with 
support from Italy and others, is pushing most strongly the aspects of the 
proposals that were most heavily criticised. After initially rejecting the UK 
proposals, Schilly performed a volte face and suggested his own variation, 
though this seemed to be in the words of his own foreign minister, Joschka 
Fischer, ‘ill-thought out’. Schilly proposed large centres where migrants 
intercepted en route to Europe would be detained. In a newspaper interview 
he explained ‘there will be a reception centre run by an EU agency made up 
of civil servants from different EU member states. These authorities will 
check whether there are grounds according to the Geneva Convention why 
the refugees (sic) should not be returned to their countries of origin. If there 
aren’t, then they’ll have to go back’ (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2 August 2004).  
According to Pro Asyl the camps are not only for those rescued on the High 
Seas, but also, or more so, for those refugees who traverse Africa fleeing to 
Europe (Pro Asyl 2003). Schilly’s plans will mean that those who are not 
entitled to asylum will be repatriated, while those that are will be 
accommodated in the region - ‘only in exceptional cases and only as a 
voluntary act will an exception to this rule be made (FAZ 22 July 2004). 
The present Italian government also forms part of this coalition of the 
willing. It has generally been unsympathetic to those arriving on its territory 
from North Africa and from the outset has favoured returning people as 
quickly as possible whence they came, seeking no guarantees as to their 
treatment. Of all the EU member states, Italy has actually pushed ahead 
quickest, unconcerned by the need for legislative niceties, deporting people 
to Libya without allowing them to make asylum claims. UNHCR and the 
Italian Refugee Council have both been refused entry to the camp where 
people are held on ‘security grounds’ (l’Unita 17 March 2005).  Before dealing 
with the Italian-Libyan situation in greater detail, it is worth discussing the 
opposition to the proposals. 
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 The Coalitions of the Unwilling 
Shortly after the proposals were presented to the JHA Council meeting in 
June 2003, the Swedish Migration Minister sharply criticized them and 
expressed astonishment that Lubbers, then High Commissioner, was 
supporting them (Nol 2003, 6). Sweden’s opposition has remained constant, 
and it is not alone. After the G5 in 2004 there was also French and Spanish 
opposition to the [German-Italian] plan in particular, with Dominique de 
Villepin (French Interior Minister) announcing that ‘for France, it is out of the 
question to accept transit camps or shelters of any kind’ (Le Figaro 19 
October 2004), while the Spanish Interior Minister Jose Antonio Alonso said 
the camps could not give humanitarian guarantees. France remains opposed 
to establish holding camps for asylum seekers to Europe, including in North 
Africa. According to French Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin in an interview 
with the Tunisian daily Le Temps:  
 
‘The Mediterranean has always been a crossroads of migration and a 
human melting-pot (but) states have a duty to exercise control over 
the flows in the interest of everyone…Paris is opposed to the idea, 
raised by certain European partners, to set up transit centres outside 
the EU, notably in North Africa, to filter candidates for immigration. 
Such a solution, apart from the moral and ethnical questions involved, 
because it is against our traditions, would have the disadvantage of 
concentrating flows of illegal immigration and assist criminal gangs 
making profits out of this traffic’ (Le Temps 24 January 2005).  
 
Nonetheless, de Villepin has said that he was in favour of creating guichets or 
‘counters’ in Maghreb countries where migrants could be received and be 
helped to repatriate (Le Monde 19 October 2004). 
Opposition has also come from outside Europe – notably from some of 
the countries mooted as potential sites from the camps. From 2003, there 
have been persistant rumours of camps either already being built (Croatia) or 
of plans and negotiations for camps in Tanzania, South Africa and the 
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Ukraine – all countries hosting significant refugee populations. Some of the 
countries hosting pilot projects, like Tanzania and Kenya, have long 
established refugee camps on their territory, so getting support for these 
camps may be an important short- to medium-term objective for these 
states. However, changing the primary function of the camps from protection 
to processing and detention prior to deportation could destabilise already 
fragile infrastructures and make them even more places to be avoided 
(Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005). It is difficult to see how this will provide 
a solution to a situation that is undesirable from the perspective of the host 
governments and the refugees. 
Certainly, Tanzania features in at least two of the planned projects 
supported by the Dutch government and UNHCR and outlined above. The 
British Home Office also proposed setting up camps in Tanzania to receive 
rejected Somalian asylum seekers from the UK or those claiming to be 
Somalian. According to a report in the Guardian, the UK had proposed a 
£4million aid package as a carrot. However, in April 2004, Peter Kallaghe, an 
aide to President Mkapa, was reported as saying this idea would be difficult 
to sell in Tanzania, given that it already hosts 400,000 refugees from 
neighbouring states. There also seemed to be a certain amount of 
resentment at the failure of the UK government to consult the Tanzanian 
government about its plans. The same month, the Home Office announced 
that it had abandoned its plans.  
Nonetheless, it is important to stress that while the proposals remain 
just that – proposals - , they embody ideas that stubbornly resurface. While 
occasionally there may be talk of development or addressing root causes as 
solutions to the ‘problem’ of migration, EU states are looking for a quick fix 
and stopping people entering their territories when they want to claim 
protection or find work as opposed to when states need labour, remains the 
preferred option. Nonetheless there are developments on the ground that 
indicate the way is being prepared for the implementation of the proposals. 
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Developments on the ground – Libya and Morocco 
While rumours have surfaced of camps in Eastern Europe and East Africa, 
two countries in particular seem ideal candidates for the proposed camps – 
Libya and Morocco. Both are significant transit countries for sub-Saharan 
Africans and so much could be done to reduce the number of people heading 
north across the Mediterranean if these two countries could be persuaded to 
seal the borders traversed by the migrants, to detain and remove those that 
do manage to enter their territories, and to readmit and remove those who 
have managed to successfully transit their territories and reach Europe. 
Certainly negotiations are taking place with both countries and both have 
accepted people deported by EU states.  
Libya and Morocco are two of the five Maghreb countries targeted by 
the UNHCR/Commission proposals. These proposals have 3 strands: 
encouraging the Maghreb states to set up a joint intercept and rescue 
scheme in the Mediterranean; training officials in human rights; and 
undertaking a mapping exercise of who is transiting the Maghreb countries, 
their routes, proposed destinations etc. To date there has been little or no 
progress in either country on any of the strands. Instead progress is 
happening outside these frameworks and through bilateral arrangements 
with individual EU member states. During the summer of 2004, Italy and 
Germany had put their weight behind the idea of camps in North Africa to the 
dismay of NGOs and some of their fellow EU Member States. 
Italy has had close relations with Libya for some time now and pressed 
firmly for the sanctions against Libya to be lifted for trade and economic 
reasons and to allow it to send more assistance, in particular to stop 
migrants and traffickers for whom Italy’s long coast offers multiple points of 
entry. On 24 August 2004, the two countries reached an agreement on 
combating ‘illegal immigration’. Libya agreed to control the borders in the 
Sahara and provide barriers against the immigration from the south. 
Berlusconi suggested that “The model of Italian-Libyan cooperation for 
fighting illegal immigration should be an example for relations between 
Europe and Africa” (Espresso 17 March 2005). Italy pursued in relation to 
Libya the same carrot and stick approach that it used in relation to other 
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North African countries such as Morocco and Tunisia – in this case giving 
financial and material support in return for readmission agreements. At the 
end of September 2004, the Interior Minister, Pisanu announced in Il 
Messaggero that "The lifting of the embargo will allow Italy to sell to 
Gaddafi...aeroplanes, boats, helicopters and off-road vehicles, necessary to 
block the traffic of illegal immigrants". But the assistance is more than just 
material. Italy has also been sending officials to Libya to help in the attack on 
human trafficking rackets, a practice already in place in Albania and Morocco.  
In contrast to the various proposals outlined above the Italian-German 
agreement took effect very quickly. In the first month of cooperation, Pisanu 
referred to results that were ‘decidedly satisfactory, as shown by the intense 
activity curbing the traffic of human beings and irregular immigrants. This 
has permitted the repatriation to the countries of origin of many thousands of 
illegal aliens, of whom 4,500 headed for Italy’ (cited in Espresso 17 March 
2005). The most high profile of these deportations occurred in October 2004 
when Libya accepted 1,000 people deported by Italy from Lampedusa and, 
unencumbered by the need to observe international conventions since it is 
not a signatory of the Geneva Convention, in turn deported them to Egypt 
and Nigeria without checking whether any of them had any claim to asylum.  
Those that have been sent to Libya had already arrived on Italian 
territory, and so should have had access to the asylum procedures had they 
so wished – this was the main objection raised by NGOs and Human Rights 
organisations at the time, but the deportations continue. Amnesty 
International has three times urged the European Commission to take a 
stand on the situation and break its silence (Amnesty International 2005). It 
might be argued that the Libyan situation is very different from the pilot 
projects currently underway elsewhere in Africa. Libya is not a signatory of 
the Geneva Convention, there are no asylum procedures in place and the 
operations are carried out in a brutal and excessively hasty manner. But 
UNHCR, funded by the European Commission, is planning on training Libyan 
officials and the Agenda commits them to encouraging Libya to sign up to the 
Convention and introduce asylum procedures.  
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The situation in Morocco is somewhat different. Morocco signed the 
1951 Geneva Convention in 1956 and ratified the 1967 New York Protocol in 
1971. It is also a signatory of the Convention on the Rights of Migrant 
Workers and their Families, unlike most EU states, and a number of other 
international conventions relating to the rights of migrants (Lindstrom 2002). 
Although it has taken some time, Morocco finally passed a law regulating to 
the entry and residence of foreigners on 11 November 20035. Belguendouz 
argues that this law is a response to external pressures, that it is an attempt 
to adapt Moroccan migration legislation to rules fixed by the Schengen 
Agreement, and that in passing it Morocco is bowing to the security 
pressures of the EU, which ‘has assigned to Morocco the role of Europe’s 
policeman in North Africa’ (Belguendouz 2003a). 
All of this legislation makes Morocco a ‘legitimate’ and therefore 
attractive partner to EU member states in their drive to control migration.  
Furthermore the two Spanish enclaves at Ceuta and Melilla have already 
created a high level of cooperation between Spain and Morocco, as Morocco 
seeks to further demonstrate its credentials as a good neighbour by 
readmitting those caught on the Spanish side of the fences. From January 
2004, under the readmission agreement, Morocco began to accept the return 
of both Moroccan and non-Moroccan nationals from the enclaves and those 
intercepted in boats. Morocco and Spain began joint naval patrols aimed at 
catching boat migrants in February 2004 and in collaboration with the 
Spanish Integrated Service of Vigilance of the Straits (SIVE) (in return for in 
return for $390 million of aid), these developments are expected to have a 
significant impact on illegal migration (Baldwin-Edwards 2004). For 2003, 
Morocco claims to have prevented some 32,000 cases of illegal migration to 
Spain, of which only half were Moroccans (Baldwin-Edwards 2004).  On five 
flights between November 2003 and January 2004 around 1,500 migrants 
were deported to Lagos – not all Nigerians (Briscoe 2004). 
Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK too have an 
interest in establishing some kind of project, though as yet nothing has been 
                                                 
5 La loi marocaine relative à l’entrée et au séjour des étrangers au Maroc à 
l’émigration et l’immigration irrégulières du 11 Novembre 2003 (02-03) 
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formalised, and EU negotiations have not yielded a great deal formally. 
Morocco had been earmarked for an Action Plan by the EU’s High Level 
Working Group on Migration and Asylum in 1999. The HLWG had formulated 
Actions Plans for a number of countries including Morocco. The goal was to 
coordinate EU policies on security, foreign policy, and development so as to 
influence the target country’s policies on human rights, democratisation, 
poverty, asylum and migration. As with most of these initiatives, this 
translated into an emphasis on pressurising the countries in question to sign 
readmission agreements and step up migration controls, and suffered from a 
lack of consultation with the Moroccan government (Belguendouz 2003b, 
Geddes 2005). The Council mandated the Commission in 2000 to seek 
readmission agreements with 11 countries including Morocco, but to date this 
has not yet been concluded (Geddes 2005, CIMADE 2004). 
Nonetheless, informally the pressure from the EU and individual 
member states has led to worrying developments within Morocco. In Morocco 
it is difficult to speak of ‘refugees’ (Lindstrom 2002, 8) or ‘asylum seekers’ 
and both groups tend to be subsumed under ‘illegal migrants’. Nonetheless, 
the since 1957 the Bureau of Refugees and Stateless Persons (BRA) has been 
charged with assisting and protecting refugees, ‘yet most refugees 
recognised by UNHCR are not granted status by the BRA’ and so cannot 
access the rights enshrined in domestic legislation (Lindstrom 2002, 13). 
Furthermore, it seems that many do not approach UNHCR either because 
they do not know of UNHCR’s existence or because of fears that their claim 
will be rejected and they will be deported (Lindstrom, 2002).  
While there are as yet no formal camps for detaining foreigners in 
Morroco, there are a number of ‘informal’ camps at important entry and exit 
points, for example close to Ceuta and Melilla, and near the Algerian border 
at Oujda, where people are deported and re-enter, and at Laayoune, jumping 
off point for the Canary Islands (in particular since it has become difficult 
because of surveillance to leave from Tangiers). There are also camps near 
the larger cities, where people seek work to support themselves and pay for 
their onward journeys. CIMADE in October last year published a report into 
the ‘alarming situation of sub-Saharan migrants in transit in Morocco and the 
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consequences of the European Union policies’ (CIMADE 2004). In the report 
they examined conditions in three of the ad hoc or squatters camps: those at 
Gourougou, Belyounech and Oujda.  
According to the report, the populations in these camps included some 
who had been recognised as refugees by UNHCR in Mali and Guinea, and 
others, who had they known it was possible to claim something like asylum, 
would have had grounds to do so, if not according to the 1951 Geneva 
Convention, then according to the Organisation of African Unity’s Refugee 
Convention (of which Morocco is a signatory, though it has not yet been 
invoked). Just over half of those interviewed (53.6%) had left their country 
of origin more than two years earlier, and on average, they had spent at 
least one year in Morocco. Most of those in the camps were the least well-off, 
few of them having the resources to pay the ‘smugglers’, and those had had 
money to pay when they left their countries of origin had fallen victim to 
‘smugglers’ who had disappeared with the money (CIMADE 2004, 21).  
Of the 95 people interviewed, 67 had suffered violence at the hands of 
the Spanish Guardia Civil, and ‘only’ 15 at the hands of the Moroccan forces, 
although these included a Cameroonian who had been hit by lead balls fired 
as he was trying to scale a fence. Two Nigerians were also killed by the 
Moroccan forces at Nador, near Ceuta (CIMADE 2004, 33). In January this 
year, a few days before the visit of the King of Spain, the Moroccan police 
cleared Gourougou, destroying the makeshift shelters and returning the 
migrants to Algeria. The following month, they surrounded the forest of 
Belyounech where approximately 1,000 people were sheltering refusing to 
allow those who left seeking food to re-enter. However, these measures are 
unlikely to have any long term effect – any more than the deportations from 
Libya. CIMADE reported that more than half of their interviews had already 
been deported and returned, in some cases up to seven times. 
The camps in this report were not enclosed, there was no intention to 
offer protection, or to process the residents. They were not managed in 
anyone’s interest. They developed spontaneously as people gathered 
together for shelter and to pool information. The irony is that migrants are 
not allowed to develop their own camps, but soon they may be incarcerated 
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in camps created by Morocco at the behest of European states, and trapped 
in a place they don’t want to be. Given Morocco’s uneasy relationship with 
UNHCR and its record of granting refugee status, it seems likely that there 
will be only the most perfunctory examination of asylum claims and that 
instead people will quickly be dispatched to Algeria, Nigeria, or Senegal or 
Mali – irrespective of where they come from. 
 
What’s new and what’s old about this emerging Asylum 
Paradigm? 
Although a number of scholars have pointed to the novelty of the emerging 
paradigm, in fact there are precedents for most of the elements of the 
paradigm. It is true that the political context has changed in the last 20 
years. The end of the Cold War marked a real and dramatic shift in 
international relations, leading to a more unstable and unpredictable world. 
From a time when international relations were, could only be, conducted 
within the framework of two powerful blocs, we now a situation where the 
fear remains, but none of the ‘frozen certainties’. One of the consequences of 
the end of the Cold war was that the fall of the Iron Curtain also allowed 
greater mobility because the political, if not economic, constraints on a 
significant proportion of the world’s population were removed. 
At the same time, there has been a transport and communications 
revolution, which while not alleviating poverty, has brought long distance 
travel within the means and imagination of more of the poor. More recently, 
the communications and identification technology has allowed states to 
register and monitor the movement of people in a light, hands-off or 
surreptitious and unaccountable manner (depending on one’s perspective) 
very different to the measures employed in the former Soviet Union, for 
example. Technology seems to allow for the tracing, monitoring and control 
of people and that is a prospect that is seductive and dangerous for any 
government. With machine readable passports, iris scans, fingerprints, 
tagging and CCTV, some governments, such as the UK’s, seem to believe 
that it will be possible to monitor movements into and out of the territory 
(Home Office 2005), and that with for example the introduction of ID cards, 
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surveillance of those in the territory and of their access to resources will be 
that much easier. If this technology can be shared with transit, or buffer, 
states then the degree of control will be enhanced even further and this is 
happening, with states including Germany and Italy sending money, 
materials and personnel to Albania, Libya and other significant transit states. 
And yet, previous innovations, passports and photo identity cards, also 
seemed to promise control, but each time technology has also provided the 
way round these barriers.  
Rhetorically, there was been a shift towards an increased use for the 
term ‘management’ rather than ‘control’6, a term that seemed somehow 
more benign, although recently there has been a shift back again towards 
‘control’7. The rhetoric of ‘migration management’ acknowledges migration as 
something positive, but a phenomenon that must be and can be managed 
(controlled?). However, as Crisp points out ‘migratory movements involving 
refugees and asylum seekers are inherently chaotic and unpredictable … 
While the notion of ‘migration management’ has a reassuringly technocratic 
ring to it, we can be sure that the reality will be considerably more complex, 
controversial and costly than this concept implies’ (2004, 14). 
This ‘management’ rhetoric has to a certain extent displaced talk of 
preventative measures in the shape of ‘root causes’ strategies, and the 
implementing mechanisms have slipped down the agenda. Now attention is 
focusing on the containment of refugees in the region of origin to a far 
greater extent. And yet, camps as an institution have a very long history, 
with some contemporary camps having been around for a very long time, 
even though the word camp itself seems to characterise a temporary 
phenomenon – an ad hoc response to an unexpected event, with was 
assumed to be temporary, exceptional and soluble. However, camps have too 
often become rooted, developing a life and identity of their own. What is not 
so clear is whether the European states that are pressurizing other countries 
to create or expand the camps within their territories see these camps as 
permanent or temporary fixtures – or whether they care.  
                                                 
6 See Bentley et al. (2003) and Spencer (2004). 
7 Compare for example Home Office 1998, 2002 and 2005. 
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It does seem that the pressures that have always been exerted on 
developing countries to contain refugees in the region are now becoming 
joined up. For some years now, European governments have been using a 
carrot and stick approach to migration policy, including asylum policy, 
promising aid or visa quotas in return for readmission agreements. And the 
reception policies of some of those countries is changing, in particular since 
the countries doing the pressurizing seem much less concerned about Human 
rights norms being respected. A blind eye is being turned by the EU and its 
liberal democratic member states to the actions of the police and armed 
forces who are pushing people back across their borders into the Sahara, for 
example. 
Finally, extra-territorial processing too, is not new – though 
traditionally it has been linked to a particular crisis and has occurred within 
the context of resettlement operations, with UNHCR processing people in 
camps in a first country of asylum before assigning them to a third country 
such as Australia, Canada or the US – who include criteria beyond protection 
needs when choosing their quota. And people have been held in camps 
around the world while being processed, perhaps most famously the 
Vietnamese Boat-People, many of whom were held in camps for decades.  
What is new is the declared and expressed intention to return people from EU 
states without examining their claim to asylum.  
And it is this, the abandonment of the principle of non-refoulement, 
and of any duty to those who do make it to the territory of European states 
that is causing the most concern. Whatever the rhetoric of commitment to 
the 1951 Geneva Convention (and that is not universal), reality seems to be 
moving in a very different direction. 
 
What is the relationship between the rhetoric and the reality? 
The rhetoric varies enormously, from that which speaks to national 
electorates of the need to reduce the number of asylum seekers (or 
clandestine entrants) by preventing them from landing in EU states, to that 
which seeks to improve the asylum infrastructure in countries in regions of 
origin, so that those who arrive in neighbouring countries can quickly seek 
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and find protection without having to undertake long and dangerous 
journeys. There continues to be talk of development, democratisation and of 
human rights though to a large extent this has now slipped down the political 
agenda – not least because it necessitates long term investment, 
considerable forward-planning, real cooperation between sending, transit and 
receiving countries that make the welfare of migrants a priority. Talk of 
control is supposed to appeal to national electorates in the receiving 
countries, but is greeted with hostility by those who are involved in refugee 
protection, who see protection losing out to the drive for control, which seeks 
short term fixes and new technology, is less concerned with development, 
and at least on the evidence so far is prepared to ride roughshod over human 
rights. The other discourse, that of capacity building, of universalising the 
1951 Geneva Convention, of creating infrastructures in those countries that 
receive most refugees and of creating durable solutions should appeal to both 
camps, refugee advocates and the advocates of control, since both desire, 
from different perspectives to reduce migratory pressures. 
It may take years for the policies relating to containment in the region 
that are currently being developed to become institutionalised within the EU 
or internationally, but they are taking shape and being implemented in a 
piecemeal fashion that lacks coherence, cooperation and courage. When the 
‘vision’ thing gets rejected, it is not always dumped – instead pilot or 
exploratory projects are launched, or the vision is used to transform 
structures already in place, so that a few years down the line, one discovered 
that what had been rejected is now well-established. That these initiatives 
happen outside of the normal policy frameworks and are promoted quietly 
and discreetly by men and women out of the political limelight means that 
they are not subject to scrutiny. And once in place, they become the norm, 
and very difficult to reverse.  
Lack of oversight is not just a problem in policy terms, but also in 
practical terms. Many camps that exist today do so in desolate and isolated 
places. While camps develop on the outskirts of cities and ports, in general 
governments prefer to site them at a distance from local populations, which 
means that what happens in those camps is also free from scrutiny. And by 
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and large, out of sight is out mind. It is already difficult to persuade 
populations in the developed and developing world to care about the 
conditions of those whose misery or abuse is visible. Confining people to 
camps renders them still more vulnerable. And people would have to be 
confined behind fences and barbed wire, and patrolled presumably by armed 
guards – if not, it seems inevitable that people would move on in an attempt 
to reach a destination they choose for themselves. And if guards are armed, 
inevitably those weapons will be used – this paper has made reference to a 
few instances where this has already occurred. 
There is a real danger that the existence of ‘protection areas’ in 
regions of origin would be used by states to shrug off their responsibilities for 
those who arrive in their territories and claim asylum. In sending people back 
to an alleged first country of asylum we will see an increase in a phenomenon 
to which the Dublin Convention was supposed to bring an end – ‘refugees’ in 
orbit. And where people end up in states in which checks and balances do not 
exist, in Libya, for example, who will be accountable for their welfare? The 
official tally of deaths of those deported from or trying to re-enter Libya was 
106 in the six months after the agreement came into effect. In the twelve 
months leading up to the agreement it was 103. 
 
Conclusion – Some Questions 
In spite of the work of academics, experts in IGOs and NGOs and even of 
their own civil servants, in spite of good work within some Ministries, and of 
rhetoric that acknowledges the importance of a holistic approach – one that 
involves joined-up policies, that deal with conflict, underdevelopment, 
political and economic instability, overwhelmingly European governments 
continue to define their ‘problem’ as one of control and all of the strategies 
developed to deal with this issue of control revolve around protecting their 
right to decide who may, or may not enter their territory and under what 
conditions. While there continues to be those who argue that governments 
must address root causes such as poverty, conflict and human rights abuses 
(for example, Castles, Crawley and Loughna 2003, Crawley 2004), others 
argue that one must understand the perspective of states and develop 
 20
solutions that states will find acceptable and that stand a chance of being 
implemented (Hathaway 1990).  
Some years ago, James Hathaway argued that it was important to 
understand what drove government policy in order to present solutions to 
real problems and hence improve the protection of refugees. At that time – 
the solution that was proposed to the problem of recalcitrant states was 
‘temporary protection’ – it was assumed that states would find this more 
palatable and that it would encourage them to take more refugees. 
Assurances were given that ‘temporary protection would be complementary 
to, and not a substitute for, the protection system in place. There is an 
important lesson to be learnt from this pandering to states’ concerns. 
Hathaway was attacked at the time, justifiably it turns out, because it was 
argued that states would use temporary protection as an excuse to move 
away from what had become de facto permanent protection. 15 years later 
exactly the same rhetoric is being used about transit centres in North African 
countries, which are said by the JHA ministers to be ‘not an alternative, but 
complementary to the European asylum system’ (CIMADE 2004, 10). The 
lesson from the temporary protection debate is that such rhetoric is not to be 
trusted.  
The consensus among NGOs and scholars seems to be that in some 
shape or form camps for the processing, detention and containment of 
migrants will go ahead. A phenomenon, a camp, that has traditionally been 
associated with an exceptional situation, and therefore a phenomenon that 
should be temporary while a solution is found, becomes itself a permanent 
solution, one in which the interests of states take precedence of those of 
individuals. I would conclude by echoing Noll and arguing that ‘the drafters of 
the “new approaches” should permit themselves a historical and analytical 
detour’. They should look again at the 1930s and the consequences putting 
groups of people into camps and dehumanising them. 
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